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AEMC Australian Energy Market Commission 
AEMO Australian Energy Market Operator 
AER Australian Energy Regulator 
AIC Average Incremental Cost  
AFSL  Australian Financial Services License 
ARENA Australian Renewable Energy Agency 
CAPEX Capital Expenditure 
CNRP Cost Reflective Network Pricing 
DG Distribution Generation 
DLF Distribution Loss Factor 
DNSP Distribution Network Service Provider 
FCAS Frequency Control and Network Control Ancillary Services 
HV High Voltage 
ISF Institute for Sustainable Futures 
kW Kilowatt: a unit of power (real) 
kWh Kilowatt hour: a unit of energy 
kVA Kilovolt amp: a unity of power (apparent) 
LET Local Electricity Trading.  
LG Local Generation 
LGC Large-scale Generation Certificate.  
LGNC / 
LNC 
Local Generation Network Credit / Local Network Credit 
 
LRMC Long run marginal cost 
LV Low Voltage 
MLF Marginal Loss Factor 
NCAS Network Control Ancillary Services 
NEM National Electricity Market 
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NEO National Electricity Objective 
NER National Electricity Rules 
NPV Net Present Value 
OPEX Operational Expenditure 
PPA Power Purchase Agreement. An agreement between an electricity 
generator and an electricity user, usually involving the user located at the 
same physical site as the generator. 
PV Photovoltaic 
RET Renewable Energy Target 
The federal Government renewable energy target, tracked via LGCs and 
STCs to  
REPEX Replacement Expenditure 
RIN Regulatory Information Notices 
STC Small-scale Technology Certificate. A renewable energy certificate 
representing 1 MWh of generation from a small scale renewable generator 
smaller than 100kW (see LGC above).  
TEC Total Environment Centre 
TNSP Transmission Network Service Provider 
TOU  Time of use 
TUOS Transmission Use Of System 
UK CDCM United Kingdom Common Distribution Charging Methodology 
UTS University of Technology Sydney 
VEET Victorian Energy Efficiency Target 
VNM Virtual Net Metering 
An alternative name for Local Electricity Trading (LET)  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Context 
This report sets out a recommended methodology for calculating a Local Network Credit 
(LNC) and summarises how the methodology was developed.  
The work forms part of the Facilitating Local Network Charges and Virtual Net Metering 
research project, led by the Institute for Sustainable Futures (ISF) and funded by the 
Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) and other partners. The project is 
investigating two measures aimed at providing a level playing field for local energy, local 
network charges for partial use of the electricity network, and Local Electricity Trading (LET) 
(previously referred to as Virtual Net Metering or VNM) between associated local generators 
and customers. Local network charges are tariffs for electricity generation used within a 
defined local network area, and an LNC is a means to deliver such a partial charge via a 
credit paid to the generator.  
Internationally, a number of jurisdictions have implemented a credit to local generators1. The 
USA and UK are the main examples, and methods range from a simple ‘rule of thumb’, such 
as in Connecticut, to rigorous ‘before-and-after’ modelling in Minnesota.  Closer to home, 
network businesses such as ActewAGL and Ausnet are offering tariffs with similarities to an 
LNC, although the calculation methodology is unclear. 
In July 2015, the City of Sydney, Total Environment Centre (TEC) and the Property Council 
of Australia, submitted a rule change request to the Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC) for a Local Generation Network Credit. 
The ISF project has conducted methodological development for an LNC and five virtual trials 
of the methodology in four Australian electricity networks. The trials and their outcomes are 
described in a separate report (Rutovitz et al. 2016). 
The proposed LNC method recognises that only part of the network is used by local 
generators, and aims to both incentivise and recompense the benefits that flow to the 
network from generation that contributes to peak abatement.  
Methodology development and principles 
We first examined international precedents 
and produced a detailed briefing paper on 
methodology options. We proposed a number 
of principles: technology neutrality, cost 
reflectiveness, transparency, and practicality, 
and used these to consider alternatives at 
each step. The options paper was discussed 
at a methodology workshop attended by cross 
industry stakeholders, and over several 
sittings of a methodology working group 
established to discuss issues which could not 
be resolved on the day. 
The methodology working group included a smaller team of network, generation and industry 
stakeholder representative that worked through the issues surrounding availability incentives, 
transmission inclusions, local generation costs and other more challenging parts of the 
methodology. 
                                                
1 Also called embedded or distributed generators 
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The main methodology components were identified as value calculation and tariff creation.  
Following the workshop it was decided to use Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) as used for 
tariff setting as the primary input to value calculation, and to take two methods of tariff 
creation into the virtual trials, a pure volumetric method and a combined volumetric and 
capacity method.  We further decided to commission work on the value creation calculation 
from Energeia as there was some concern that current LRMC values would not reflect the 
long run benefits of local generation. 
Results of the virtual trials  
Network LRMCs were the biggest influence on the total LNC value available. Ergon Energy’s 
network had the highest cost and consequently the highest LNC, while Powercor’s was the 
lowest. The other significant influence on the calculated LNC rate is the number of hours 
chosen for peak periods, as a broad band (i.e. many hours) results in a lower value.  Peak 
LNC values ranged from: 
• 6.8c/kWh in the Essential network based on offering for 1,300 hours in the year 
• 32.5c/kWh in the Ergon network based on offering for 650 hours in the year.  
The Essential network had the broadest payment times and therefore the least targeted LNC, 
which potentially incentivises generation outside of the times that it is necessary for peak 
abatement.  
In all cases, the maximum LNC that a fully available (always on) generator connected at the 
LV level could capture fell between approximately one third and a little over one half of the 
tariff that is charged to an equivalent constant load. This stems from the fact that some of the 
network will always be used by a generator and is therefore not credited. 
Recommended methodology 
We recommend an LNC with the following features: 
• A total value based on the Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) of the network levels 
above the connection point, and distinguished by customer class. The LRMC 
calculation methodology should match the DNSP’s LRMCs used in existing 
consumption tariff setting (generally includes augmentation expenditure only) and be 
adjusted for power factor and for the capacity effects of avoided losses. Transmission 
network value should be included, but avoided energy losses excluded. 
• The LRMC value should be scaled back by a benefit-sharing factor, to allow some of 
the benefits of reduced network costs to flow to the network and consequently other 
consumers via reduced charges.  
• A tariff structure based on targeted volumetric payments with honed peak / shoulder / 
off-peak periods with approx. We suggest 500 hours or less in the defined peak 
window with at least a 90% peaking probability during that time would be an 
appropriate starting point, but should be refined by DNSPs based on the response of 
generators to the price signal. 
• LG costs should be minimised in the short term through the same means as currently 
occurs, by the prevention of export when this imposes particular costs on the 
network. This will inherently prevent payment of an LNC when export is causing costs 
rather than benefits. 
• In the long run we recommend that:  
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o The cost of bi-directional networks flows should be included in LRMC 
calculations for tariff setting, and those identified costs subtracted from the 
LNC calculation; 
o The benefits of reduced replacement investment (repex) from downsizing 
should be included in LNC calculations; and 
o The cost of new connections should remain excluded from the LRMC (e.g. the 
line extension to a new property), however the costs of non-direct 
augmentation, repex and opex on the shared network driven by the new 
connections should be included (e.g. substation or line upgrades to deal with 
this new load). 
• Informed by the economic modelling performed as part of this project (Kelly et al., 
2016) it is also recommended that LNCs should not be paid to existing non-
dispatchable generators, or to new generators under 10kW. This recommendation 
aims to maximise economic benefits to all consumers, on the basis that the primary 
value of LNCs is to influence the initial investment and/or operational decisions of 
generators in a way that supports the network. These generator categories were 
considered less able to fulfill these criteria. More work is required to determine the 
value of offering LNCs to existing dispatchable generators, depending on the network 
and generator circumstances. 
 
The calculation method is also available in an accompanying spreadsheet [ISF LNC 
Calculator.xlsm]. 
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Summary of recommendations 
 
Value calculation 
Framework for network value of 
LG 
• 1) Use LRMC as the value basis 
for the LNC.  
• 2) Use the same method to 
calculate LRMC as is used by 
networks in tariff setting.  
• 2.1) Include repex value from 
downsizing or retirement as this 
becomes better understood.  
• 3) Apply a discounting and benefit 
sharing factor to the LRMC. 
Calculation by location, network 
level and customer class 
• 4) Locational specificity to match 
specificity used by networks in 
consumption tariffs. Use customer 
class and voltage level as 
locational proxies for the type of 
network. 
• 5) Adjust LRMC for the network 
value of losses and network power 
factor impacts. 
Transmission value 
• 7) Include Transmission LRMC 
value, signal value through 
probabilistic tariff structure as per 
recommendation 6). 
Avoided losses 
• 8) Do not include the value of 
avoided losses, these are included 
in the energy value. 
LG Costs 
• 9) Apply the interim solution of an 
export gateway. 
• As bi-directional augmentation 
costs become more commonly 
quantified, subtract these from the 
LRMC value.  
Tariff Creation 
Volumetric allocation:  
• 6) Assess the probability of the 
peak happening in each hour of 
the year, allocate hours into peak, 
shoulder, off-peak (and optionally 
critical peak) periods. 
• Choose relatively tight peak 
periods with high peaking 
probability. 
• Multiply the value set in the 
previous steps by the peaking 
probability of each hour in the 
relevant period. 
Generator inclusions and 
exclusions 
• 10) Exclude existing non-
dispatchable generators, and new 
generators under 10kW from LNC 
payments (to maximise economic 
benefits). 
Payment settlement 
•  11) The LNC should be mediated 
via a retailer; generators without a 
retailer should secure that 
relationship.  
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Conclusion 
This work provides a recommendation for an LNC methodology, which is generally in line 
with the consumption tariff setting methodology. The inputs required for the LNC 
methodology are the same, or very similar, to those required for setting consumption tariffs, 
so the introduction of an LNC should not require undue administrative resources for 
calculation.  
Some of the questions that have arisen during LNC methodology development are of broad 
interest, and should be debated outside the rather technical discussion of setting an LNC 
methodology. In particular, the question of how to meet the cost of adapting our networks for 
a future where the prosumer is the norm, and how those costs should be shared, is a broad 
societal question that deserves general discussion.  
Additional research needed  
This work highlights the following areas where additional research and debate is desirable in 
order to refine the recommended method: 
• Calculating the value of local generation and storage in reducing replacement 
investment; 
• Calculating the network costs associated with increasing DG penetration; 
• Discussion of how the above costs of DG should be borne in the context of an 
evolving electricity network; and 
• Refinement of the value setting and benefit sharing parameters to ensure that the 
LNC is sufficiently targeted to incentivise generator investment and operational 
behaviour. 
• Exploration of user behaviour aspects in terms of price signal sensitivity in responding 
to an LNC, including investigation of whether an LNC is likely to be passed through to 
consumers. 
• Calculating the portfolio effects and average diversity of the distributed generation 
portfolio. 
• Further examining the effects of the miss-match in transmission and distribution cost 
reflective network pricing methodologies to assess the most appropriate way to 
include avoided transmission costs. 
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  6:? 1#0?6:
The project “Facilitating Local Network Charges and Virtual Net Metering”, led by the Institute 
for Sustainable Futures, at the University of Technology Sydney, and funded by the 
Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) and other partners, brings together 
consumers, researchers, electricity providers and government to help level the playing field 
for local energy generation and prepare for the electricity grid of the future. The project is 
researching the impacts of local network charges for partial use of the electricity network, 
and Local Electricity Trading (LET, also known as Virtual Net Metering) between associated 
customers and generators in the same local distribution area.  
A Local Network Credit (LNC) has been adopted as the means to deliver partial network 
charges in this project. Two key deliverables of the project are the development of a 
proposed methodology for calculating an LNC, and five virtual trials which of the effects 
of an LNC and LET on the economics of local energy projects. This paper outlines ISF’s 
recommended methodology for calculating the value of an LNC.  
   0R4VH=V
The electricity market is changing as technologies such as solar panels and battery storage 
improve and become more affordable. Many consumers are interested in not only using 
electricity, but trading with the grid and with each other, becoming ‘prosumers’ who generate 
some or all of their own electricity and sell the excess back into the market. 
Improving the business case for small-scale, local generators (LG) to sell electricity locally, 
by offering innovative tariffs and billing arrangements, could unlock substantial new clean 
energy potential and reduce the negative impacts of customers taking their load off the grid. 
To give an example, small to medium businesses (such as local councils or universities) may 
want to generate electricity at one site and use it at another site nearby, using only a small 
proportion of the distribution network. 
Network businesses are currently unable to offer a tariff to reflect partial use of the network to 
transport electricity between nearby sites, which may be as close as two meter points in the 
same building, or on two sides of a road. Electricity retailers do not routinely offer the 
capability to “net off” energy generated at one site at one or multiple other sites. 
This means that local generation is commonly sized to match the lowest onsite electrical load 
to minimise grid exports, reducing economies of scale and operating efficiency. The existing 
market structure incentivises local generators to maximise the amount of energy being 
generated and consumed ‘behind the meter’. This may result in inefficiently high levels of 
private sector investment in the equipment to avoid using the grid altogether, or equipment 
that duplicates network infrastructure (private wires). 
   BKDVDTHORFDO4HVYRTNFKDT-HU
Local network charges are reduced network tariffs for electricity generation used within a 
defined local network area. This recognises that the 
generator is using only part of the electricity network and 
reduces the network charge accordingly. Following previous 
work on the practicality of applying a reduced network 
charge for electricity sourced locally, and paying a network 
credit to local generators, the latter was recommended as a 
means to deliver reduced network charges for local 
electricity (Rutovitz et al. 2014), and is the mechanism investigated in this project.  
A Local Network Credit (LNC) seeks to address inefficient outcomes in the NEM whereby 
LGs that provide or have the capability to provide benefits to the network are not currently 
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incentivised to do so. LG is currently being deployed at significant scale, and an LNC 
provides a lever to steer its operation and deployment in a manner that has the greatest 
system benefit.   
To date network credits for local generation have been applied systematically in the UK, and 
to a limited extent in the US. See Appendix in Section for more detail on how and where LNC 
style mechanisms have been applied. 
   BKDVLUEHL4-GR4HL4.WUVTDO LD@VKH6!3STRMHFV
The ISF project is researching the impacts of both reduced ‘local network charges’ for partial 
use of the electricity network, and ‘Local Electricity Trading’ (LET, also known as Virtual Net 
Metering) between associated customers and generators in the same local distribution area. 
The centrepiece of the research is five ‘virtual trials’ of local network charges and LET in New 
South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. It is the first time local network charges have been 
tested in this way in the Australian market. 
Figure 1: The virtual trials            
The LNC methodology and the virtual trials will 
feed into economic modelling of the effects of an 
LNC, in order to gain better understanding of the 
scale of costs and benefits likely to ensue, the 
effect on future rollout of efficient local 
generation, and the implication for distribution 
and transmission networks.  
The introduction of local network charges and 
LET is expected to unlock substantial new local 
energy resources, including additional 
renewable energy potential. The intended 
outcomes of the project are: 
a) Five virtual trials of local network charges 
and VNM.  
b) A recommended methodology for 
calculating an LNC. 
c) An improved understanding of the 
metering requirements and indicative 
costs for the introduction of VNM. 
d) Economic modelling of the benefits and 
impacts of an LNC.   
e) Increased understanding by stakeholders 
of the requirements for the introduction of local network charges and VNM. 
 	  ?KHTWOHFKD4-HSTRSRUDOIRTD484:0
The City of Sydney, Total Environment Centre and the Property Council of Australia 
submitted a rule change request to the Australian Energy Markets Commission (AEMC) for 
the Local Generation Network Credit (LGNC) on July 14th 2015. The rule change request 
was informed by work previously commissioned by the proponents and conducted by ISF in 
2014 on the options for calculating the benefits and costs of LG. The results of the ISF 
project feed directly into the AEMC’s consultation on the rule change proposal. 
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  92?5184C12A2892:?
The recommended methodology to calculate an LNC is the culmination of 12 months of 
research and consultation during this project, combined with the outcomes of previous 
research on LNCs. 
   TRFHUU
Initial desktop research was undertaken to review methodologies currently in operation 
internationally and in Australia. A detailed briefing paper was produced that outlined ISF’s 
proposed approach to calculating the value of an LNC and identified unresolved issues 
(Langham et al. 2015). Participants in the methodology workshop held on 24 August 2015 in 
Sydney discussed these methodological issues in calculating the LNC.  
Figure 2: Methodology development   
The purpose of the workshop was 
to: 
• Agree on two methodologies to 
apply in the five virtual trials of 
the LNC; and 
• Gain better understanding of the 
issues involved in developing a 
robust, workable and effective 
methodology. 
Major consultation questions were 
discussed at the workshop and 
remaining issues were dealt with through methodology working groups.  
In addition to the processes outlined above, ISF took part in a series of AEMC consultation 
workshops on the proposed rule change for an LGNC. Feedback from these workshops was 
also taken into consideration when deciding on a recommended methodology. 
   ?KHPHVKRGUVDNH4VRVT LDO
Based on the outcomes of the workshop and working groups, ISF took forward two methods 
for testing in the trials: 
1. A volumetric tariff  
2. A combined volumetric and capacity tariff,  
These two methods were selected for several reasons: 
• As all international precedents use volumetric methods, it was decided that trailing at 
least one pure volumetric method was important.  
• Most distribution tariffs for consumption in Australia have a combination of volumetric and 
capacity (peak demand) charges, and there was seen to be merit in an LNC that rewards 
generation in a way which mirrors the way consumption is charged. Two different 
combined capacity and volume tariffs had been proposed in the briefing paper, a ‘bottom 
up’ method in which each step was derived from first principles, and a ‘mirror’ method in 
which each step reflected as closely as possible consumption tariffs. It was thought there 
would be insufficient difference between “bottom-up” and the “mirror” combined 
volumetric-capacity methods, so that trialling both would offer less valuable insights. 
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• Stakeholders agreed that volumetric tariffs were much easier for customers to 
understand, and less complex to apply. We wanted to determine through the trial whether 
the value outcome for of the tariff is substantially different for a volumetric and combined 
volume-capacity tariff. 
   .GGLV LR4DO;DOWHFDOFWODVLR4
ISF proposed in the briefing paper to use the LRMC exactly as calculated for tariff setting as 
the basis of the value calculation for an LNC, however stakeholders expressed concern that 
it would not deliver the appropriate value to the LNC in the current investment environment (a 
recent over investment in network capacity resulting in lower LRMC values). 
Participants agreed that it would be practical to stipulate the same method be used to 
calculate the LRMC for LNC setting as for the tariff setting for the purpose of trials, but were 
less sure this is how it should be done in the long term. There was considerable interest in 
the project investigating alternatives for value calculation. 
Based on this feedback, ISF contracted Energeia to undertake modelling on an alternative 
value calculation, using a standard Average Incremental cost (AIC) method to calculate the 
LRMC value. This alternative AIC value was used for sensitivity testing in the trials, and used 
in the economic modelling of the LNC. 
 	  .SSOLHGDUDFTHGLV VRVKH-H4HTDVRT
There was originally extensive discussion of whether the LNC should be transactionally 
applied as a reduced charge to the electricity consumer, or as a credit to the generator. 
Following consultation in late 2014 (Rutovitz et al. 2014), there was a clear response that it 
should be a credit to the generator, primarily because of the ease of implementation. 
The current rule change proposal was submitted on this basis for a Local Generation 
Network Credit. The proposed LNC is fundamentally a mechanism to deliver appropriate 
charges for partial use of the network and reward network benefits provided by local 
generation. The proposal stipulated a credit to the generator because of the significant 
complications involved in implementing a reduced charge on consumption, as this would 
require keeping a register of local transactions. 
An LNC methodology should therefore focus on valuing the network not used by local 
electricity flows. A consequential effect may be long-term network cost reduction even in 
those areas that are currently not constrained. The ISF project is investigating the extent to 
which an LNC can reduce the repayment of sunk costs on a per customer basis, by retaining 
a larger transactional base.  
While there are still valid conversations to be had over geographical and timeframe aspects 
of value calculation, clarifying the original rationale emphasises the importance of 
considering the value of the LNC relative to the cost of network services to the consumer, 
and not just relative to the near-term savings made by the NSP.  
 
  TL4FLSOHURID48:0
This section outlines the core principles that should underpin a methodology for 
calculating LNCs. 
According to the rule change submitted to the AEMC on 14th July 2015, two key features 
of the proposed Local Network Credit are that the credit should:  
! “[provide] a price signal for exported energy” 
!  “..reflect the long-term economic benefits (in the form of capacity support and 
avoided energy transportation costs) that the export of energy from a local 
generator provides to a distribution business, including reduced or avoided 
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transmission costs that would otherwise be passed through to end users.” (Hoch 
& Harris 2015) 
This is in line with the general economic principles of pricing infrastructure: “ the 
promotion of efficiency requires the setting of prices that encourage the optimal use of 
existing infrastructure assets while signalling to users the cost of an additional unit of a 
good or service.” (Kemp et al. 2014).  
An underlying principle of an LNC is of equity of pricing and outcomes for users who are 
unable to access distributed generation technologies. In the absence of an LNC there 
remains an incentive for those who can self-supply to minimise the network tariffs they 
pay, through load defection. This leaves other consumers to bear increasing prices as 
network charges are levied on fewer remaining consumers. An important rationale for 
any LNC methodology developed is that it continues to promote efficient use of existing 
infrastructure and not defection from it, thereby promoting tariff equity. 
These basic principles are listed below, with some secondary principles. 
Figure 3: LNC principles 
 
Together these principles can be used to test the effectiveness of a particular 
methodology, which should have the following features: 
! Provision of a price signal to incentivise: 
- Peak operation: at the times when LG can provide the most benefit to the 
network in addressing peaks, and  
- Availability and reliability: of LG units during peak period. 
! Cost reflectivity: the methodology should calculate the value of the LNC so that 
investments in both LG and network expansion meet load in an economically 
efficient manner.  
! Stability: the LNC should be sufficiently stable and predictable to allow for 
sensible investment decisions and conform with the pricing principle of 
gradualism. 
! Transparency and simplicity: the method should be transparent and easy for 
LG owners and operators to understand and respond to. 
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! Practicality: the methodology should be practical for NSPs (both transmission 
and distribution) and retailers to implement, and fit broadly within existing 
metering and billing systems. 
! Neutrality: the LNC should be technology neutral, which implies:  
- Calculation on performance rather than type of generator 
- Applicability to LG across a range of sizes 
- Allowance for the contributions of many small generators, when 
considered in aggregate, to be incentivised in the same way as an 
equivalently sized larger generator with the same performance. 
- Incentivisation of LG exports to reduce system peak in the same manner 
that load reduction is incentivised (where there is the same impact on 
system use). 
   /H4HILVUD4G0RUVURI84
Table 1 sets out the commonly recognised benefits of local generation (LG) and whether and 
how each benefit was planned to be captured in the calculation of the LNC.  
Table 1: LG benefits – whether and how these are captured in an LNC 
CATEGORY TO BE CAPTURED? HOW CAPTURED 
REDUCTION IN DISTRIBUTION COSTS:  
• Avoided or deferred 
augmentation  YES LRMC of avoided capital costs 
• Progressive downsizing of 
replacement infrastructure NO 
Ideally should be calculated as LRMC of 
avoided replacement costs, but data not 
available 
• Reduction of associated 
operating cost expenditure YES LRMC of avoided operating costs 
REDUCTION IN TRANSMISSION COSTS:  
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CATEGORY TO BE CAPTURED? HOW CAPTURED 
• Categories as per 
distribution above YES 
LRMC method as above 
 
AVOIDED LOSSES:   
• Reduced energy generation 
requirement NO 
Currently addressed in voluntary 
arrangements for retailer Feed-in Tariff or 
buyback.  
• Reduced upstream network 
capacity requirement YES 
Applied as uplift to capacity impact on 
LRMC of avoided transmission & 
distribution capital costs & associated 
operating costs 
Network services: voltage & 
frequency support NO 
Addressed through Frequency Control and 
Network Control Ancillary Services (FCAS & 
NCAS) on transmission network. For 
distribution this an issue for future 
consideration. 
Improving network 
utilisation: retaining long term 
network revenue in a declining 
demand environment 
NO 
Anticipate that a societal benefit is likely to 
exist here but is difficult to calculate and 
best to assume captured as societal divided 
 
The question of how costs associated with high DG penetrations should be met was subject 
to a working group discussion, with four options put forward by ISF. The primary focus of the 
working group was whether and how such costs should be integrated into an LNC. It was 
clear that the discussion raised broader societal issues regarding how the cost of adapting 
the network for much higher penetration of LG should be shared, and the incumbent 
generator advantage implied in the current network configuration.  
   TREDELO LUV LFDSSTRDFK
The generators considered in this report include both dispatchable and non-dispatchable 
plant. Due to the scale of generation considered, generators are dispersed 
geographically and we consider it appropriate to treat them as a diversified portfolio. We 
treat generation at a particular location at a particular point in time as having a 
probability of abating a peak event. This probability is primarily driven by DNSPs 
estimates of peak windows due to assessments of the load profile.  
   THFHGH4VU64;HUVL-DVHG
Six methodologies for LNC calculation were reviewed in the methodology briefing paper 
(Langham et al. 2015). The approaches and the strengths and weaknesses of the six 
different methodologies for calculating LNCs internationally are shown in the Appendix.  
A number of elements from these precedents have influenced the development of our 
recommended methodology. The main elements adapted for use in the preferred 
methodology presented in this paper are:  
• Voltage level of connection to allocate value:  Allocation of network value by 
voltage level as used by the UK once again provides the framework that is used in 
our methodology development. 
• Probability of peak occurring: Ausnet and the UK both incentivise LG operation at 
particular times based on the probability of generation in those times assisting with 
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meeting peak periods, and we have adopted this as the means to send time based 
signals.  
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In the trials we tested both a volumetric tariff (method 1) and a combined volume and 
capacity tariff (method 2).  
The LRMC and the period (peak, shoulder, off-peak) periods are key inputs to the LNC rates. 
Each network selected their own set of peak, shoulder and off-peak periods and the 
probabilities of the peak occurring during those periods. 
The values for each network are shown in Table 2 and Table 3 for each connection level 
(remembering that the LNC is only paid for the network values above the level at which the 
LG connects). With the exception of Powercor, all networks used the same peak, shoulder 
and off-peak periods for the upper and lower tier calculation in the volumetric method.  Most 
networks simply applied their existing peak shoulder and off-peak cycle used in customer 
billing. 
Some networks, such as Powercor and Ergon chose relatively tight peak periods. This can 
be seen by the relatively high value available in quite a small proportion of the year in the 
charts below. This is contrasted with application to Essential Energy’s very long standard 
peak and shoulder periods, which resulted in both periods having very similar ‘smeared’ LNC 
values, given a relatively high likelihood of a peak event happening in either period. 
Table 2: LNC values – volumetric method 
  
Ergon Powercor Essential Ausgrid 
Connection level 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
  
c/kWh c/kWh c/kWh c/kWh 
Peak 32.5 28.3 15.4 22.3 21.8 9.5 6.8 4.6 2.7 12.4 9.3 7.9 
Shoulder n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  5.6 3.8 2.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Off-peak 4.8 4.2 2.3 0.06 0.06 0.03 1 0.7 0.4 0 0 0 
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Figure 4 graphically shows the LNC value at the lowest connection level, i.e. the low voltage 
system, and the proportion of the year that value is payable.  
With the exception of Powercor, all networks used the same peak, shoulder and off-peak 
periods for the upper and lower tier calculation in the volumetric method.  Most networks 
simply applied their existing peak shoulder and off-peak cycle used in customer billing. 
Some networks, such as Powercor and Ergon chose relatively tight peak periods. This can 
be seen by the relatively high value available in quite a small proportion of the year in the 
charts below. This is contrasted with application to Essential Energy’s very long standard 
peak and shoulder periods, which resulted in both periods having very similar ‘smeared’ LNC 
values, given a relatively high likelihood of a peak event happening in either period. 
Table 2: LNC values – volumetric method 
  
Ergon Powercor Essential Ausgrid 
Connection level 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
  
c/kWh c/kWh c/kWh c/kWh 
Peak 32.5 28.3 15.4 22.3 21.8 9.5 6.8 4.6 2.7 12.4 9.3 7.9 
Shoulder n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  5.6 3.8 2.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Off-peak 4.8 4.2 2.3 0.06 0.06 0.03 1 0.7 0.4 0 0 0 
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Figure 4: Volumetric LNC by network rates and percentage of year they are paid 
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Table 3: LNC values – combined volumetric and capacity payment method 
  Ergon Powercor Essential Ausgrid 
Connection level 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
VOLUMETRIC 
PORTION c/kWh c/kWh c/kWh c/kWh 
Peak 16.2 14.2 7.7 5.6 5.5 3.8 3.1 2.1 1.2 9.4 7.0 6.0 
Shoulder  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  2.5 1.7 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Off-peak 2.4 2.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SUPPLY 





3.35 2.92 1.59 0.46 0.45 0.31 0.45 0.30 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.09 
 
The combined LNC (Method 2) involved splitting the LRMC into volumetric and capacity 
portions. The relative share of this split was applied on the basis of the existing split in 
consumption tariffs between kWh and kW (or kVA) based tariffs. The capacity portion of the 
combined LNC was influenced both the DNSPs’ LRMCs and the percentage allocation of the 
LRMC towards the capacity payment. Figure 5 shows the amount of total LRMC per network, 
and the proportion assigned to capacity and volumetric payment in the combined tariff, and 
the resulting potential payments in $/kW/day.  
The capacity rate was offered based on generator availability during peak periods only. For 
Ausgrid and Essential this was year-round, whereas Powercor had winter and summer peaks 
and Ergon summer only.  
Once again Ergon’s rates were the highest due the high LRMC of the Ergon network and the 
summer only payments. Ausgrid’s capacity portion was the lowest of the networks in our 
trials, which was influenced as much by the lower allocation of LRMC towards the capacity 
portion, and by Ausgrid’s lower LRMC. 
Payment of the capacity portion of the combined LNC was based on the minimum generation 
event over a specified period, which was usually one month. Some networks chose to 
average a few minimums over the period. However, in all cases the generator only needed to 
be out for maintenance or resource variability for a few hours in the peak period to be 
excluded from the payment. For those networks that chose to use a year long period to 
calculate the payment, this meant any outage in peak periods over the year would almost 
certainly result in a zero payment.  
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Figure 5: Capacity portion of combined LNC rates 
 
   .GGLV LR4DO8 90PRGHOO L4-
As part of the trials, Energeia was commissioned to produce a model as an alternative basis 
for estimating the LRMC of the networks. This provided a way of normalising the time 
horizons and inclusions the different networks had used to calculate the LRMC, and as a 
potential second method for setting the value for the LNC.  
Energeia calibrated its model against published network LRMCs, meaning that when inputs 
are set to match the assumptions used by DNSPs, the resulting LRMCs are nearly identical 
to those provided by network businesses. These calibration outcomes are presented in 
Figure 6. Note that comparisons of these Figure 6 outputs should not be made across 
different DNSPs, as inputs such as cost inclusions/exclusions and time horizons are not 
consistent.  
Figure 6: Energeia-calculated vs network-supplied LRMCs (using settings applied by 
each DNSP) 
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The Energeia model allowed us to assess LRMC results based on exclusions and 
assumptions that are set by the user. Altering these from the DNSPs own assumptions leads 
to an assessment of DNSP LRMC under a standardised set of assumptions (25-year time 
horizon, 10% probability of exceedance, and the including of the impacts of connection costs 
on replacement, augmentation and operating costs, but excluding the direct costs of new 
connections).  




   1LUFWUULR4
After inputs had been standardised, the results showed that for all networks except 
Powercor, LRMC values were not significantly altered. This meant that the values produced 
by the networks or the Energeia tool would provide a strong foundation for the basis of the 
value to be signalled via the LNC, and confirmed that the LRMCs provided where not 
significantly sensitive to the altered assumptions. 
The result for the Energeia modelling of the Powercor network showed significant variation 
between the two values following the change in input assumptions. This is the result of 
different methods to calculate the LRMC; both methods exclude the direct costs of new 
connections, however, only the Energeia calculation includes the ongoing non-direct 
augmentation and replacement costs on the shared network associated with those new 
connections.   
In the case of Powercor, while results for subtransmission and HV networks are similar, 
Powercor’s valuation of the LV network at approximately $5/kVA/yr is significantly different 
from the Energeia tool, when these ongoing non-direct augmentation and replacement costs 
associated with new connections are included. 
Energeia’s value may also include some non-demand driven augmentation expenditure that 
cannot be differentiated from RIN data, but is excluded from Powercor's LRMC trial 
calculation, such as bushfire related works. We note this difference is in the consumer’s 
favour, as it will result in lower consumption tariffs, but also a lower LNC for the Powercor 
network. 
We determined that the LNC methodology should continue to use the LRMC as calculated by 
networks and accepted by the AER, this means the consumption tariff LRMC will match the 
LNC LRMC, and minimise the opportunity for ‘gaming’ by generation proponents or 
networks. 
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Note that currently replacement/refurbishment investment is generally not included in NSP 
LRMC calculations and any avoided costs associated with these cost categories should be 
considered in future calculation of the LNC (refer to Section 5.2 for more detail). 
 
   0KRRUL4-SHDNSHTLRGUVRSTRPRVHHII LFLH4V
FRUVEH4HILV UL-4DOU
The ability of a tariff structure to efficiently signal to a generator the benefits of operating at 
peak times is predominantly determined by the peak period selected by the network. At one 
extreme, a flat rate across all hours of the year provides no signal at all. At the other 
extreme, an availability payment offered retrospectively for only those hours of the actual 
yearly system peak also does little to incentivise behaviour, as it provides no advance 
warning to generators. In between these extremes lie the possibility for DNSPs to set peak 
times that incentivise generation when it is useful on a probabilistic basis. 
Networks in the trials selected between approximately 600 hours per year (7% of the year) 
and 1800 hours per year (20% of the year) as the nominated peak period, as shown in With 
the exception of Powercor, all networks used the same peak, shoulder and off-peak periods 
for the upper and lower tier calculation in the volumetric method.  Most networks simply 
applied their existing peak shoulder and off-peak cycle used in customer billing. 
Some networks, such as Powercor and Ergon chose relatively tight peak periods. This can 
be seen by the relatively high value available in quite a small proportion of the year in the 
charts below. This is contrasted with application to Essential Energy’s very long standard 
peak and shoulder periods, which resulted in both periods having very similar ‘smeared’ LNC 
values, given a relatively high likelihood of a peak event happening in either period. 
Table 2: LNC values – volumetric method 
  
Ergon Powercor Essential Ausgrid 
Connection level 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
  
c/kWh c/kWh c/kWh c/kWh 
Peak 32.5 28.3 15.4 22.3 21.8 9.5 6.8 4.6 2.7 12.4 9.3 7.9 
Shoulder n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  5.6 3.8 2.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Off-peak 4.8 4.2 2.3 0.06 0.06 0.03 1 0.7 0.4 0 0 0 
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Figure 4. A peak window at the lower end of this spectrum will provide better signalling of 
generation value and thus an LNC more effective at targeting generation at peak events. 
This however must be tempered by a network’s confidence in identifying a peak window with 
a sufficiently high peaking probability.  
This finding has influenced recommendation 6. 
 	  RVH4VLDO4HVYRTN;DOWHVREHFDSVWTHGITRP
GLUVT LEWVHG-H4HTDVRTU
We calculated the charges a continuous 1kW load would be billed in each of the trial network 
areas, and compared them to the calculated LNC that would be paid to a 1kW generator 
operating 100% of the time at the lowest connection level in those areas. These are shown in 
Figure 8, alongside the actual LGNC earned by a trial generator in that network area 
(generator type varies by trial). 
In each case it was found that consumption tariff billing was substantially higher than the 
LNC, which is logical, in that for all LNC calculations one or more network levels are 
excluded. Additionally, no uplift factor for repayment of sunk capital is applied to the LNC as 
would be applied in regular consumption network tariff setting (Kemp et al. 2014). 
Figure 8: Total value in LNC by network (LV connected generators) 
 
The total LNC value ranged from approximately one third to a just over one half of the 
equivalent consumption charge, depending on the DNSP. Another way of conceptualising 
this is to say that the value of the network costs avoided when delivering energy from local 
generators is approximately one third to just over on half of the value of the network used to 
deliver energy from centralised generation plant.  
It appears that a generator with strong consistent performance has the potential to make 
significant contributions to network cost abatement. Using the LRMC values and calculations 
from our trials, a 1kW generator connected at the LV level has the potential to reduce peak 
costs by between $196 (Powercor) and $603/kW (Ergon) per year. 
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We identified the following steps in an LNC calculation methodology:  
Figure 9: Methodology components 
1. VALUE CALCULATION 
a. Framework for network value of LG  
b. Calculation by location, network level 
and customer class    
2. TARIFF CREATION 
a. Allocating value to LG by volume, 
capacity, or both 
b. Allocating value to LG by time 
3. OTHER ISSUES 
a. Treatment of LG costs 
b. Avoided transmission costs 
c. Avoided losses 
 
We have assumed throughout that the general principles for cost reflective network 
pricing as applied to tariff setting should be followed in the calculation method for the 
LNC, unless there is a reason why applying these methods will lead to an inefficient or 
inequitable outcome in a particular instance. These principles are set out in general terms 
in advice published by the AEMC (Kemp et al. 2014). 
Note that there is a methodological barrier in identifying the cost reflectiveness of network 
pricing because the network is broken up into separate operators for distribution and 
transmission. Almost all consumers experience a bundled price (except for network 
losses), because they receive a bundled service. So for the purpose of offering cost 
reflective tariffs for local generation, a bundling of all network costs makes sense from 
the customer’s perspective. However, for the purposes of this paper, avoided 
transmission costs are discussed separately in Section 7.1 due to different 
implementation precedents.  
Section 5 addresses two issues, the general approach taken to determining the value of 
the LG to the network, which by implication is the approach to calculating the LNC, and 
the specifics of how this can be applied to calculating an LNC. Section 6 addresses how 
to translate the overall value of the LNC into a tariff, and Section 7 the treatment of LG 
costs, avoided transmission costs, and avoided losses.  
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The two main alternatives for calculation of the value of LNC are: 
• Reference service approach: The difference between current network charges and 
the lowest cost of provision of an alternative ‘reference’ service (i.e. a private wire). 
This approach is currently allowed for within chapter 7 of the Western Australia 
Electricity Access Code, and is the concept of the “prudent discount” mechanism in 
the NER, which is intended to prevent inefficient bypass of the transmission system. 
• LRMC of network services approach: the avoided cost of network augmentation 
and replacement equates to the long run marginal cost (LRMC) of network services, 
This should include growth-related augmentation which is caused by an increase in 
demand (and therefore may be avoided as a result of LG or reductions in demand), 
and in the case of falling demand, any reduced replacement expenditure. Associated 
operational expenditure should be included. (Note that while this applies to both 
distribution and transmission, transmission is addressed separately in Section 7.) 
 HFRPPH4GHGPHVKRG@8:0;DOWHUHVV L4-
A central tenet of the rule change proposal on cost reflective pricing was to set “cost 
reflective tariffs in a manner that reflects the LRMC of providing network services”. To 
maintain consistency with this principle, using the LRMC of network services is the preferred 
approach to calculation of the LNC.  
This also recognises a key limitation of the alternative service approach, which requires a 
defined generator and a defined consumer, which is inconsistent with the proposed Rule 
Change to direct a LNC payment to the local generator, recently submitted by the City of 
Sydney, Total Environment Centre and Property Council of Australia (see Section 1.4). 
The LRMC in natural monopolies tends to decline with scale, as illustrated in Figure 10.  
Thus using the LRMC alone as the basis of tariff tends to lead to under-recovery of revenue 
compared to the overall network costs. The normal practice is to mark up the LRMC based 
values in order to ensure NSP revenue covers costs (Kemp et al. 2014, pg 8). 
We recommend that an equivalent mark-up is not added to the LNC. Rather, we suggest that 
any potential gap between the actual value of LG and the credited LNC value may be 
captured by all customers as a societal benefit from the introduction of an LNC. 
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Figure 10: Long Run Marginal Cost in natural monopolies (Riley 2015)  
 
Recommendation 1: Use LRMC as the basis of the value calculation for an LNC. 
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   SVLR4UFR4ULGHTHG
The main alternatives for calculation of the LRMC are the Average Incremental Cost (AIC) 
and the perturbation method, which can have significantly different outcomes for the actual 
value calculated in different circumstances (Kemp et al. 2014).  
Average incremental cost approach 
The average incremental cost approach estimates LRMC as the average change in forward-
looking operating and capital expenditure resulting from a change in demand. This is 
represented by the following formula: !"#$!(!"#) = Present!value!(cost!of!new!network!capacity + associated!operating!costs)Additional!demand!served!at!future!reference!year  
 
The AIC is defined as referring to an increment in demand, but a similar calculation could be 
undertaken for the reduction in capital expenditure on replacement (and the corresponding 
reduction in operating costs) resulting from a reduction in demand.  
The UK CDCM method uses the AIC method to calculate LRMC to determine both the cost 
of network services and the avoided costs associated with LG. 
The perturbation method 
The perturbation method looks at the direct changes in forward-looking operating and capital 
expenditure as a result of a specific change in demand (kWh or kVA). This is represented by 
the following formula: !"#$!(!"#$%#&) = Present!value!((revised!CAPEX + OPEX) − (original!OPEX + CAPEX))Additional!demand!served!at!calculation!year  
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While calculations are usually applied to an increase in demand, it can as easily be applied 
to a decrease in demand.  

    HFRPPH4GHGPHVKRG@8 90FDOFWODVLR4
The AIC method is widely used for current NSP calculations feeding into tariff settings, as the 
perturbation method requires detailed information at a granular level.  
The AIC method by definition is the average cost of demand increments, and smooths 
projected expenditure over the entire increase in demand. It will tend to underestimate the 
LRMC when the network is close to being constrained, as at that point a small increase in 
demand could trigger a large amount of expenditure. The perturbation method will tend to 
return very low values when the network is not constrained, and may underestimate the 
LRMC.  
We consider the AIC method to be more suitable for calculating long run averages over 
customer classes, provided it can be adapted to provide the average LRMC of reductions in 
demand, as well as increments in demand.  
We note however that recent changes in electricity law under the ‘Power of Choice’ rule 
change stipulate to DNSPs that either the AIC or the perturbation method may be 
used.(Australian Energy Market Commission 2014) ISF notes that the perturbation method 
can allow DNSPs to provide more locationally-targeted cost reflective pricing where it is 
efficient to do so, despite the additional calculation costs. 
Rather than prescribing which method is preferable for LNC calculations, stakeholders 
agreed that it would be practical to stipulate the same method be used to calculate the LRMC 
for LNC setting as for the tariff setting for the purpose of trials, but they were less convinced 
that this is how it should be done in the long term.  
ISF considers that if there is a mismatch in the way LRMC is calculated for cost reflective 
consumption vs cost (benefit) reflective generation then there is the potential for ‘gaming’ to 
occur both in the way that generators and consumers behave put also in the way it would 
allow DNSPs to pick different calculation methods for the cost/benefit of two events that 
otherwise have the same impact on the network, i.e. a generation event and an equivalent 
reduction in demand event. ISF considers this to create the potential for perverse outcomes. 
An additional benefit is that as DNSPs improve the cost reflectivity of their tariffs, particularly 
with regards to locational accuracy, the locational accuracy LNC will automatically follow suit 
with no additional administrative burden.  
It is important that the LRMC of downsizing assets as a result of long run reduction in peak 
demand, which is likely to be particularly important for transmission and sub-transmission 
elements in the future, is incorporated in whichever method is used. Note that this has not 
been possible within this project, as there was insufficient data on the cost savings that may 
be associated with downsizing. This is an important area of research as we move towards a 
network with large amounts of distributed generation.  
Recommendation 2: Use the same method to calculate the LRMC for LNC setting as 
for the tariff setting. 
 

   /H4HILVURIGRY4UL?L4-RTTHVLTHPH4VR4VKHTHSODFHPH4VF>FOH
Through the consultation process we learned that existing LRMC calculations undertaken by 
DNSPs do not measure the marginal cost in a downsizing of network capacity. Such a figure 
could be calculated in a similar way to the AIC or Turvey method discussed in LRMC 
calculation method. Some parts of the network (e.g. poles and switchyards) will likely see no 
benefit from a reduction in required capacity. Other assets such as transformers could realise 
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significant savings if replaced with smaller units.  Despite this, the key limitation of including 
such benefits in the LRMC at this time is the lack of information on the nature and magnitude 
of these savings. 
Recommendation 2.1: When the marginal avoided costs of reduced investment in 
downsizing or retirement as a result of local generation are better understood by 
NSPs it should be included in the potential savings signalled via the LNC. The most 
appropriate method for including this is to assess the costs of replacement business as usual 
at the end of asset life and compare it with the costs of the smaller capacity replacement, or 
the retirement of assets in a meshed network. 
 

   1LUFRW4VL4-D4GEH4HILV UKDTL4-EHVYHH4
-H4HTDVRTUD4GRVKHTFR4UWPHTU
The National Electricity Objective (NEO) is set out to "promote efficient investment in, and 
efficient operation and use of, electricity services for the long term interests of consumers of 
electricity with respect to price, quality, …[and other factors]” 
If ‘consumers’ are defined to be non-generating customers, to achieve the NEO some of the 
long run benefit of reduced augmentation would need to be realised by the electricity 
consumer. If the full value of the LRMC of the avoided network is credited to the generator, 
societally the total cost of network would remain unchanged. A benefit-sharing factor is a 
means to ensure the value proposition of local generation is captured by both proponents 
and non-participating customers. It also can serve as a means of discounting the savings 
calculated for reduced augmentation, thereby ameliorating the uncertainty associated with 
both network costs and demand forecasts. 
A discounting and benefit-sharing factor would be applied as a reduction in the LRMC that is 
an input to the LNC calculation. This would be a predetermined ratio, for example 80%. In 
this case, local generation would capture 80% of the calculated value it creates (to influence 
generator uptake and behaviour), and the remaining percentage would remain a discount to 
reflect uncertainties present in LRMC assessment and demand forecasting.  
It is likely that an LNC would incentivise a significant amount of behind the meter generation, 
thereby reducing augmentation costs without attracting an LNC payment. In the economic 
modelling undertaken for this project, this effect increased the benefit of the LNC by a factor 
of six (Kelly et al., 2016), which it is assumed would be passed to all consumers in the in the 
form of reduced tariffs in the long term. The discount of 20% in the amount paid to the 
generator adds to the value accruing to non-generating customers2. 
The discount factor applied would need to allow sufficient value to be captured by the 
generator in order to incentivise the correct behaviour to realise the network augmentation 
savings. Based on the trials we expect that a minimum level to be retained by the generator 
would be in the order of 70%. However, further work would be required across a broader 
cross section of generators and a greater proportion should be payed to the generator if 
DNSPs find that a lower amount does not incentivise the desired export behaviour.   
Recommendation 3: Apply a discounting and benefit-sharing reduction to the LRMC 
to allow for uncertainty present in LRMC demand forecasts and cost estimates. 
 
                                                
2 Under the Efficiency Benefit Sharing Scheme the customer and network business may share the 20% of 
value created by the local generation, however this sharing has not been the focus of our work. 
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 	  0DOFWODVLR4E>ORFDVLR44HVYRTNOH;HOD4GVDTLI I 
FODUU
Local generation will avoid network costs for the network levels upstream of that unit. As 
such an LNC calculation needs to consider where LRMC is incurred across the different 
network levels.  
Furthermore, different customer classes contribute to the total network LRMC in differing 
proportions. An LNC set for one customer class based on an LRMC calculation that includes 
other customer classes may result in cross subsidy and should be avoided. Work for the 
AEMC by NERA on economic pricing concepts describes allocating LRMC at a network level 
to each customer grouping (Kemp et al. 2014, pg 16).  
This approach of costing by network level and tariff class reflects current tariff setting practice 
and thus should be familiar to all DNSPs in the NEM. 

 	   HFRPPH4GHGPHVKRG@USHFLILFLV>RI8 90
Network Level and Customer Class 
We recommend calculating LRMC for both customer class and voltage level of the network, 
resulting in $/kVA/yr figures by network level and customer class. It should be noted that the 
LRMC of the whole network would be the weighted average of the individual customer class 
LRMCs.   
To translate the LRMC values into an LNC for LG connected at a particular part of the 
network, it is necessary to then allocate the levels of the network being used by the LG. This 
is in effect the same as crediting the LRMC of the parts of the system not used by the LG. 
We recommend applying the following principle: LG should pay in full for the transport of 
power at the level of connection and below (i.e. ‘downstream’). It should not pay for the levels 
of the network above where it is connected (i.e. ‘upstream’), to the extent that the LG is 
available during system peak periods. This principle is the approach applied in the UK CDCM 
precedent. 
How this principle is applied to the LRMC components is shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: Components of LRMC forming LG local network charge, according to the 


































































Co-Located (Same site)         
LV System Connected         
LV Substation Connected         
HV System Connected         
HV Substation Connected         
Sub-Transmission Connected         
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Location 
Each DNSP applies tariff setting for different regions differently. Typically, distribution 
networks do not differentiate between regions, although some split their territory down into a 
small number of pricing zones where there are large differences in the cost of supply. By 
contrast, transmission networks are highly location specific in their charging structure. We 
recommend the value is produced and applied for each relevant pricing zone, to reflect 
current tariff setting practice. The LNC should become more locationally specific in line with 
network consumption tariffs. In general we consider it important that both consumption tariffs 
and the LNC adopt a greater level of locational specificity over time to improve cost 
reflectivity of both types of tariff. 
Recommendation 4: Assess LRMC based on customer class and network level to 
delineate parts of the network that particular generators may impact. While there was a 
range of opinions on how location specific the credit should be, it was determined that the 
LNC should move towards locational specificity at the same rate that cost reflective 
consumption tariffs move towards specificity, so that the LNC uses the same LRMC 




  .GMWUVPH4VIRTFDSDFLV> LPSDFVRITHGWFHGORUUHU
Network capacity upstream needs to meet not just the energy requirements of downstream 
loads but also the losses incurred in transporting the energy through the various levels of the 
distribution network. One kVA of generation at a low network level will avoid more than one 
kVA of network capacity upstream. The difference will be the ratio of the Distribution Loss 
Factor (DLF) at the generator connection point to the DLF at the upstream network level. It 
should be noted that Distribution Loss factors apply to the distribution network and Marginal 
Loss Factors (MLFs) to the transmission network. As this section of the calculation is 
referring to distribution network capacity only and not energy value, the DLF has been 
applied. 
This step begins with locating the generator in the network by both network level of 
connection and by customer type.  Then, the ratio of the loss factors is calculated for each 
network level above the generator connection point.  !"#$%&'"!!"#$!"#$%&'(!!"#"! != !"#$!!"#$!"#$%&'(!!"#"! !!!× !!"#!"#"$%&'$!!"##$!%&"#!!"#$%!"#!"#$%&'!!"#"!  
This methodology is not dissimilar to ActewAGL’s avoided TUOS methodology (ActewAGL 
2013). The key difference is that it is applied as a ratio to each network level as opposed to 
only a single ratio back to the transmission connection level.  
An example is presented below for the case of a small commercial customer’s generator 
connected at the distribution sub level.  
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Table 5: Hypothetical example of proposed application of uplift of capacity impact due 














per kVA exported 
at generator 
connection level 
Subtransmission 24 1.0019 1.0330 24.8 
HV Zone Substation  33 1.0052 1.0296 34 
HV Feeder 69 1.0293 1.0055 69.4 
Distribution Sub 48 1.0350 1 48 
LV 93 1.0490 n/a n/a 
TOTAL 257    
 
Recommendation 5: Adjust the LRMC for each network based on generator 
connection point to account for the capacity effects as a result of losses using the 
following formula, noting that this adjustment will need to be calculated for generator 
connection level within each customer class. !"#$%&'"!!"#$!"#$%&'(!!"#"! != !"#$!!"#$!"#$%&'(!!"#"! !!!× !!"#!"#"$%&'$!!"##$!%&"#!!"#$%!"#!"#$%&'!!"#"!  
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   SVLR4UFR4ULGHTHG
Once the overall value of the LNC has been calculated, the next step is to allocate the value 
to customer classes via a specific tariff. A fundamental decision is how the tariff is paid, with 
the three options being volumetric, capacity, and both volumetric and capacity. The main 
characteristics and pros and cons of the three alternatives are summarised below.  
There are subsequent calculation options for how volume and capacity payments are 
applied, which have a significant impact on the tariff effectiveness. Figure 11 shows the 
decision tree associated with volumetric and capacity payments. Dark blue shaded boxes 
indicate the approach adopted in the trials. 
Figure 11: Decision tree for volumetric and capacity payments 
 
 
Option 1: Volumetric payment alone 
A volumetric payment may be applied as flat rate or Time of Use (TOU). We assumed that 
TOU would be adopted, as flat rate does not meet basic principles of efficiency as it does not 
incentivise operation at times that reduce network costs. 
A TOU payment may include an adjustment for generator availability. For example, the UK’s 
CDCM method applies an “f” factor by generator type, while the Minnesota method attempts 
ISF recommended options for trial 
tariff highlighted 
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a uses actual performance-based aggregate availability in determining the value of the 
generation unit. 3 
The main advantages of volumetric payments are: 
• The only two systematic precedents for LNC tariffs are both paid via a volumetric 
payment (see the UK CDCM method and the Minnesota method in Appendix A) 
• Implementation is straightforward, as TOU volumetric payments require only an 
interval export meter 
• Transparency and stability: once the tariff is calculated it is understandable and 
provides a stable environment for LG investment decisions 
• Incentivising performance: volume payments structured on a TOU basis provide a 
price signal for generators to operate during these pre-identified periods 
Potential disadvantages – depending on the detail: 
• Allocative efficiency: a volumetric payment based on the LRMC should be cost 
reflective overall, but the distribution of value to particular LGs may be incorrect.  
Outstanding issues – depending on the detail: 
• Availability adjustment: a volumetric payment would be technology neutral. 
However an availability adjustment is required to incentivise generator availability. To 
remain technology neutral an Australian LNC would need an availability adjustment 
based on actual generator availability as a substitute for the UK CDCM “F” factor, 
which sets a pre-defined adjustment for availability (breaking the neutrality principle). 
 
Option 2: Capacity payment alone 
A capacity payment is given for the provision of capacity during defined periods, with many 
options for defining the period and other parameters.  
The main advantages of capacity payments are: 
• Cost reflectivity: Capacity payments are the most obviously cost reflective 
payments, as network capacity peak periods are the main driver of marginal costs. 
• Incentivising future performance: capacity payments may offer a strong price 
signal, as LG is only paid to generate at those times most useful to the NSP.  
 
Potential disadvantages – depending on the detail: 
• Applicability: Many smaller customer classes do not currently have capacity 
payment components, metering and billing infrastructure may not be in place to apply 
capacity payments, and the concept may be more difficult to communicate to 
residential or small commercial customers. 
• Incentivising performance: if the time period is very long, or if the allocation to time 
is after the event (in which an event is defined as the top peak day(s) for the year, or 
the top 30 minutes for the month) the ability to send an effective price signal is greatly 
compromised, as the LG does not have the information to modify behaviour. 
• Transparency and stability: the payments will be difficult to understand or use as 
the basis for investment, as the outcome would be extremely variable according to 
                                                
3 The Minnesota calculation is done according to the generation profile of the class of generators for a full 
year or set of sequential full years. Where the data is not available the Minnesota method prescribes the 
simulation methods to be applied. 
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the design details chosen. As different NSPs apply capacity charges in different 
ways, it is perhaps less likely that a consistent approach will be agreed. This could 
lead to considerable variation between NSP areas, and potentially between 
regulatory periods.  
• Neutrality: while capacity payments appear to be technology neutral as they reward 
performance, an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach to capacity charges across a whole peak 
period would not, in effect, be technology neutral. For example, requiring capacity 
across an entire 2-8pm peak period would always result in a zero credit for Solar PV, 
yet a 4pm critical peak would still have been lowered by the PV contribution. This is 
an argument for allocating to LG value both capacity and volumetric components. 
 
Option 3: Combined volumetric and capacity payments 
Combining both a volume and capacity payment may address many of the concerns that 
attach to one approach or another, providing the best aspects are taken from each. A 
proposed combination is shown in Table 6 and is:  
• A TOU volumetric payment, without an availability adjustment (as availability is 
addressed through the capacity payment component); and 
• A capacity payment according to minimum availability during defined peak periods. 
If a combined volumetric and capacity method is used, it is assumed that the LRMC and 
allocation by customer class and network level would be the same as for the volumetric 
calculations, with the exception that there would be no need for an availability adjustment. 
ISF considered multiple options in assessing how to split the LRMC value that a generator 
may be credited between a demand (per kVA or per kW) and volumetric (per kWh) LNC 
structures. 
The combined volumetric tariff ISF determined was practical to implement and appropriate 
for the trials was to split the LNC LRMC based on the percentage split that networks expect 
to use when recovering costs from demand and volumetric tariffs (per kWh). This was 
dubbed the ‘mirror’ method. 
Networks would then be given discretion as to whether a single minimum generation event in 
a period was used as the crucial event or if an average of a certain number of minimums was 
more appropriate. ISF determined that it was appropriate that a reset period of 1 month was 
an appropriate maximum length of time. For the trials most networks used a single minimum 
event in a month as the basis for the capacity portion of the combined tariff 
The key advantages of the mirror method are that it reduces the complexity of setting the 
LNC for each NSP, and avoids duplication of effort. It is also intuitively equitable and easy to 
understand. The key disadvantage is that it is only as cost-reflective as the LG customer’s 
tariff, which may not be very cost reflective currently, but will increasingly become so.  
   9HVKRGUVHUVHGL4VKHVTLDOU
ISF took forward two methods for testing in the trials: the volumetric tariff and a combined 
volumetric and capacity tariff (Option 1 and Option 3), which are shown against the principles 
put forward in Table 7. 
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Volumetric TOU with availability adjustment                
Volumetric TOU without availability adjustment 
AND 
Capacity Payment 
              
Table 7: Summary of the two tariff setting methods trialled  
  VOLUMETRIC COMBINED VOLUMETRIC + CAPACITY 
 LRMC of augmentation and (ideally) replacement 
CAPEX and OPEX (standard cost reflective tariff 
approach) with: 
• AIC / perturbation LRMC chosen as per customer 
class & network level 
• Include LRMC of downsizing and replacement 






Allocate by network level and customer class, as per 
standard cost reflective tariff approach 








Mirror existing consumption 








Split LRMC into a lower and upper tier based on lower 
levels of network experiencing peaks on a day/work 
week basis and upper levels experiencing system 
seasonal peaks. Assign upper level LRMC value to 
relatively few hours in the year. 
Capacity payment rewards 





 Peak, shoulder and off peak by network tier (allow 
DNSPs to set different peak shoulder off-peak cycles 
for the lower and upper tiers).  Adjust value of kWh in 
peak / off peak periods by DNSP estimated probability 
of peak occurring during that period. 






values/ costs  
Additional values:  Avoided TUOS value Same as volumetric method 
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   1LUFWUULR4
We considered that the capacity methods trialled were likely to under-incentivise local 
generation and that volumetric methods trialled may over-reward local generation.  
The trialled volumetric payment’s over-rewarding of generation can be understood in the 
context of a generator or generator class that operates consistently during daytime hours but 
is not present at night, in a network area with a peak period spanning the afternoon into the 
evening. Generation will be present to alleviate peaking in the afternoon however will not 
assist in reducing the evening congestion, the actual peak value may change very little 
despite being shifted toward later in the evening.  
The split of the network in to two tiers did not have the desired impact of providing a stronger 
availability signal in the volumetric payment. Only one network chose to set different peaking 
periods across the two tiers. As a way to set lower tier peak times for this case, we examined 
the average of five zone substations in the area, each servicing similar customers. However, 
the resulting peak times were similar to the system level peak times. As a result it was 
concluded that the two-tier approach added complexity but insufficient value to the 
methodology to warrant pursuing this method. 
The trialled capacity payment’s tendency to under-incentivise can be drawn out through 
considering the case of two generators, each of the same capacity, one operating for the first 
half of the peak period and one operating for the second half of the period. Both of these 
would receive a zero capacity payment due to the half-period outage. But when the two 
generators are considered as a portfolio, the network receives a consistent generation 
profile, but does not pay either a capacity payment. 
In providing a recommendation we have considered which of the two methods can be best 
adapted to represent a middle ground. As the methodological development progressed it 
became clear that a volumetric payments and capacity payments are not as distinct as might 
be considered at first glance: 
• A targeted volumetric tariff, when signalled through fewer and fewer peak hours, 
begins to behave very similarly to a capacity payment. Considering an extreme case 
of a volumetric tariff paid in a peak period consisting of only one hundred hours, ten 
hours or even one hour, reveals that the choice between a volume a capacity 
payment is in fact a spectrum, not a black and white choice.  
• A capacity tariff, when reset on a shorter cycle, will behave similarly to a volumetric 
tariff. For example, consider a capacity tariff paid based on minimum generation level 
during a period with the period reset weekly, daily, or even hourly. 
Both tariff structures are possible to hone or broaden, however we consider a volumetric 
payment is relatively easy to hone and target towards the necessary peak periods. 
Consultation with partners revealed that resetting a capacity tariff on a cycle more frequent 
than a billing cycle was seen as a more complex way of achieving the necessary market 
signal. 
Recommendation 6: Allocate tariff value through a well-targeted volumetric TOU 
methodology. To provide the right availability incentive the DNSP should choose relatively 
few hours of the year for the peak period and ensure the peak period selected has a high 
peak probability. Further work would be required to determine exactly the number of peak 
hours each network should select, however we estimate that no more than 500 hours with 
greater than an 90% change of the peak occurring would appropriately incentivise the right 
level of availability and avoid unnecessary payments to generators not active at peak times. 
Networks would be prudent to refine the hours chosen and subsequent price signal provided 
with a view to what incentivises the desired behaviour from the prosumer market. 
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The value of avoided transmission costs is analogous to avoided distribution costs described 
in Section 5. However, as the LNC only considers LG embedded within the distribution 
network, no granular understanding of the cost by level of the transmission network is 
required.  
TUOS charges are made up of three components: Usage Charges (Entry/Exit charges), 
TUOS Services Charges and Common Service Charges. TUOS Services charges are further 
split into locational and non-locational components (Figure 12). 
As Section 5.5(h) of the NER stipulates that registered (large) generators are eligible to 
received avoided TUOS rebate, each network business has a method for calculating this 
value. The value of avoided TUOS is determined by each DNSP, and is intended to reflect 
reduced augmentation costs of the TNSP. The formula calculates to the reduced costs 
incurred by the DNSP at the point of transmission connection, as a result of the LG’s 
existence. All avoided TUOS methodologies we are aware of in Australia use only the 
locational component as the basis of the avoided TUOS value.  
Figure 12: Transmission cost breakdown 
 
Source: Adapted from Powerlink (2015) 
 
It should be noted that, with the exception of entry charges, all of the revenues in the above 
chart are recovered from loads (via charges levied on DNSPs). 
A submission we received in the consultation process with Working Group members 
suggested the origin of the 50:50 split in TUOS services was originally intended to be a split 
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intuitive fairness, as both are present in equal measure in a balanced electricity market. 
However, at the time, generators argued that as their investment decisions were already 
made there was little point in sending a generator locational price signal. That is, there was 
little scope for an existing generator to relocate and respond to that price signal. As a result 
we understand that the generators argued for the transmission company to recover these 
costs in a non-locational way from loads. 
A further submission we received indicated that the non-locational component is adjusted by 
an overs/unders mechanism to correct for any under or over recovery from year to year. We 
understand this to be the basis for its exclusion from the standard avoided TUOS 
methodologies. So if this were refunded by a DNSP on the basis of it being avoided, it would 
only be re-couped in a later year via the overs/unders mechanism, leading to no real cost 
avoidance by the DNSP. 
   SVLR4UFR4ULGHTHG
The options for a transmission services avoided cost methodology are: 
1. Apply the same distribution LRMC calculation decisions (in Sections 5 and 6) to 
the transmission network. The benefit of this approach would be in creating 
consistency and transparency of application between NSPs and for all levels of the 
network. The disadvantage of this approach are that it adds administrative complexity 
as it requires the LRMC to be calculated for transmission, and creates a new 
transaction involving the TNSP that differs but overlaps with the existing avoided 
TUOS calculation.  
2. Apply the inverse of all transmission charges. This was proposed by one trial 
participant on the basis that local generation makes no use of the transmission 
network, and as such all transmission fees should be refunded. This method was 
heavily contested by DNSPs for the following reasons: 
a. Under an annual revenue requirement, some categories of transmission fees 
will not be avoided, a reduction in fees paid one period will lead to higher 
prices in the next period (although the same issue would also occur in Option 
1 to a lesser extent). 
b. Even if a customer or group of local customers uses no net electricity, the 
connection to the transmission network provides the ability to receive 
frequency support and an additional level of supply redundancy. 
3. Utilise the existing avoided TUOS methodology of each NSP, but apply it to all 
LG as opposed to just registered generators. The benefit of this approach is that 
there is a well-established method that DNSPs are comfortable with, although this is 
heavily contested by some local generation proponents. The negatives of this 
approach are that: 
a. The method may not be consistent (in that NSPs may have different 
methodologies);  
b. There is currently not full transparency in how this methodology is applied;  
c. The means of calculation may be more simplistic in how peak demand 
reductions from LG are treated than some of the options explored for DNSP 
capacity charges. This may be particularly true for variable output generators, 
and as such the method may not be technology neutral. 
d. Current methods calculate and reward peak generation availability ‘after the 
fact’ (post the peak occurring), which eliminates the ability for a generator to 
have advance notice of when their generation has value. 
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4. Estimate avoidable LRMC from the parts of transmission tariffs that relate to 
network augmentation costs. This method is similar to method 1 however is not 
based directly on LRMC and thus acts as a placeholder for LRMC information. This 
method only relies on TNSP published data. The value directed to the LNC is similar 
to an avoided TUOS methodology but also includes ‘non-locational’ components. 
Published TUOS prices relating to the locational and non-locational transmission 
costs (but not common services) are used as the inputs. This method has the 
following advantages and disadvantages: 
a. It represents a compromise between methods 2 and 3 with respect to how 
much value is attributed to the reduced requirements from the transmission 
network.  
b. The following arguments were raised regarding the inclusion of non-locational 
charges: 
i. As non-locational charges are a historic consequence of an original intention 
to split the cost recovery between loads and generators, it is important to 
consider if local generation would reduce transmission network congestion 
caused by transmission connected generators. Given that local generation 
will reduce the need for centralised generation we consider this to be 
reasonable. 
ii. The overs and unders mechanism, if unchanged in its application, would 
lead to perverse outcomes if the non-locational charges are included. This is 
because a saving by a DNSP of non-locational charges due to local 
generation is corrected for in the next regulatory period. This is driven by an 
increase in the non-locational charge component allowing the TNSPs to 
correct for its under-recovery. Thus the current overs and unders 
mechanism would mean that DNSPs do not realise cost reductions over the 
medium term. 
For the trials, method 4 was selected on the basis that it could be calculated with entirely 
public information and that the value allocated represented a compromise between the 
desires of those on the generator proponent’s side of the debate and the networks. In this 
selection we note the flaws that this is not necessarily an accurate estimate of LRMC and 
that for this to be fair in its treatment of DNSPs either the overs and unders mechanism 
would require alteration, the current avoided TUOS methodology would need to be amended 
to include non-locational components, or transmission pricing would need to become LRMC-
based. 
The trials revealed: 
• Considerable disagreement between generation proponents and DNSPs regarding 
the value that embedded generators were able to contribute. 
• For LV connected generators, we found the trailed method (Option 4) resulted in 
approximately one third of the value of the LNC being from the transmission network. 
The only network to significantly deviate from this was Ausgrid, where the 
transmission value was closer to one half of the LNC.  
• The value associated with TUOS stemming from non-locational TUOS Charging 
ranged between approximately 40% (Powercor) and 75% (Ausgrid) of the total TUoS 
value, meaning that our method results in much higher avoided TUOS values.  
Economic modelling was conducted which included sensitivity analysis on the 
inclusion/exclusion of the non-locational component of the transmission pricing. These 
results and ensuing implications are covered in Kelly et al. (2016). 
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Recommendation 7: Determine avoidable transmission LRMC and convert to a price 
signal as per distribution LNC methodology. 
We propose that the LNC calculation should be consistent across both transmission and 
distribution network.  
For this to be implemented it would require TNSPs to calculate and publish their prices and 
have them based upon LRMC. We note that currently in Australia the price setting 
methodologies for transmission and distribution are quite different, with only distribution 
pricing having a firm basis in LRMC. Distribution pricing has only recently changed in 
response to a push for greater cost reflectivity in network pricing and currently transmission 
pricing continues to reflect backward looking costs.  We note the recent trend in the 
Australian electricity sector to base network pricing on LRMC and note that there is no 
inherent difference between transmission and distribution networks that would suggest that 
transmission and distribution networks should continue to have cost-reflective network 
pricing (CRNP) methodologies that are different in how they attempt to signal price and cost 
to consumers.  
Due to the difference in CRNP methodologies, introduction of an LNC including avoided 
transmission value would, if it is to be cost reflective, require review of other parts of 
transmission pricing and/or avoided TUOS mechanisms.  Without such reviews there is likely 
to be a mismatch in the value a generator may be eligible for and the value received by the 
DNSP in reduced TUOS charges. For avoidable transmission value to ‘pass through’ 
correctly it would require one of more of the following: a review of avoided TUOS 
methodologies to include non-locational components; a review of the overs and unders 
mechanism regarding non-locational pricing elements; and/or a review of the transmission 
CRNP methodology with modifications to make it LRMC-based. 
In the interim and in the absence of transmission cost reflective pricing being based on 
LRMC, we endorse the rule change proposal’s stance of “including reduced or avoided 
transmission costs that would otherwise be passed through to end users.” (Hoch & 
Harris 2015), 
 
   .;RLGHGORUUHU
Local generators reduce the losses in delivering energy from the generator to the customer. 
Combined losses for the transmission and distribution systems are in the order of 6-10% for 
urban networks and 10-15% for rural networks (Langham et al. 2014). 
Energy losses must be credited as a volumetric payment as they are inherently related to 
power flows rather than capacity. Currently, avoided losses from LG are captured as an 
(uncalculated) benefit to the electricity retailer; therefore, the payment required to correct this 
issue is from the retailer to the LG. This is currently done through a voluntary (e.g. NSW)4 or 
mandatory (e.g. Victoria)5 retailer-offered Feed-in-Tariff.  
The calculation of the value of losses is price x volume as follows:  
• The volume of losses is calculated as the sum of the percentage of losses (the ‘loss 
factor’) for each level of the network upstream of the LG, multiplied by the annual 
generation of the LG. This should include both avoided distribution and transmission 
losses. 




5 For renewable energy generators only. http://www.esc.vic.gov.au/Energy/2014-Minimum-Feed-in-
Tariff/Final-Decision-Minimum-Feed-in-Tariff-for-2015 
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• The price used should be the energy wholesale value for the relevant time-of-use 
(peak, shoulder or off-peak) period. 
 
Recommendation 8: As the avoided losses transaction must involve the retailer rather 
than the DNSP, it is considered that the only option is to exclude avoided losses from the 
LNC calculation, and recommend that retailers undertake to offer the above calculated 
avoided loss value to LG for all exports at a minimum.  
Additional Note 
Note that the reduction of losses not only has an energy impact, but also has an equivalent 
capacity impact on the levels of the network upstream of the LG. This is incorporated as an 
uplift of the capacity impact of the LG on each upstream level of the network (see Section 
5.5). The magnitude of the uplift is defined by the loss factor of at each level of the network in 
relation to the level of the network where the generator is connected. 
 
   ?THDVPH4VRI84FRUVU
There are a number of potential cost increases as a result of LG connections to, or 
operation on, the network. These include costs associated with: 
• The ability of the network to safely handle levels of fault current which may be 
increased by nearby presence of LG (commonly referred to as “fault levels”). 
• The management of voltage stability, where a very high penetration of LG exists on a 
part of the network with low demand (e.g. long residential feeders with large amounts 
of PV and low daytime demand). 
• Power flows in the ‘reverse’ direction along feeders or other network elements that 
were not designed to accommodate this type of flow. For example, protection grading 
costs. 
It is useful to note the status quo situation that applies to generation that exceeds the 
capacity or power quality parameters of the existing network: 
a) Augmentations driven by marginal increases from cumulative effects of smaller 
generator installations are usually not required to pay for augmentations, as it is 
difficult for an NSP to attribute the augmentation to any particular generator. 
b) If, at certain times of day, generation exceeds the network’s capacity (due to line or 
feeder impedance) the voltage will rise. Most networks require all generation to have 
voltage protection settings that will trip the generator (ceasing exports to the grid) if 
voltage exceeds a certain threshold. This has been known to occur in residential 
areas with high solar PV penetration and low daytime consumption. This is 
sometimes considered unfair by some generation proponents as they feel they have 
been ‘allocated’ capacity when they receive a connection approval from the NSP. It 
should also be noted that this effective export limitation inherently incentivises 
technologies that actively manage a generator’s impact on the network, such as 
batteries and inverters that can provide voltage support, which then allow the 
generator to continue exporting. 
c) Generation proposals that significantly exceed the capacity of the network are usually 
rejected or required to pay augmentation costs as part of their connection. Where this 
is infeasible the network will ban further connections.  
If an LNC were implemented, we note that the status quo of export limitation would also turn 
off LNC payments. That is, generators prevented from exporting due to b) or c) above would 
naturally receive no LNC. However, under the status quo, once capacity his hit there is no 
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impetus to upgrade the network to include bi-directional flow capacity even if this was 
economically efficient, as parties benefiting from the upgrade are not sharing the costs fairly. 
   SVLR4UFR4ULGHTHG
There are three possible options to deal with these costs: 
1. Do nothing and accept the limitations posed on generation as part of the status quo. 
2. Incorporate into avoided LRMC calculation: compute a LRMC for this cost 
component, and subtract from the LRMC benefit calculation. This would require some 
regulator guidance for approval of certain types of network upgrades. 
3. Pioneer scheme: This would mirror the existing way pioneer schemes are 
conducted: an LG requiring a new expenditure would pay for the upgrade and be 
recompensed by subsequent LG connections, which would otherwise be ‘free riders’ 
on the costs borne by the initial pioneer. 
   1LUFWUULR4
There is a wider societal discussion to be had about whether the cost of adapting our 
network to the technologies of the future is most appropriately shared by all. It may be 
argued that requiring a strict user-pays approach confers a significant advantage on 
incumbent (centralised) generation, as all system users have paid for the development of the 
current configuration (uni-directional flows). Making any deviation from this traditional 
network development path on a user pays arrangement has been argued by some 
proponents to ignore the need for infrastructure to evolve with technological transition. 
Conversely, large amounts of new LG is not likely to be beneficial in all areas of the network 
from the perspective of efficient system operation and cost reduction, and some limit on 
managing cost of high penetrations will need to be part of the solution.  
The way in which costs of bi-directional flows are included in reforms will impact the way that 
customers experience network limitations. This wider discussion is well beyond the scope of 
this methodology development. However, we consider it important to select an option that 
facilitates a transition to a network fit for bi-directional flows and encourages installation of 
technologies that support this future network (e.g. batteries and smart inverters).  
Adopting the “do nothing” or status quo approach effectively applies a ban on export for a 
particular period of the day and/or a ban on additional generator installations. This, although 
imperfect, would appear to encourage technology upgrades to manage network voltage and 
or load/generation shift to times of day that are more useful. 
Averaging the cost of network upgrades into an LRMC as per option 2 was the most cost 
reflective method considered. This approach promotes stability and predictability that are 
important for investment decisions of local generation proponents. However, in addition to 
the wider issues raised about how the network transformation should be paid for, this 
approach would be administratively challenging at this point in time. While the LRMC 
augmentation costs are commonly considered by DNSPs for poles and wires, they are not 
routinely calculated for augmentation allowing bi-directional flows. 
A pioneer scheme was closest to the networks’ existing method for dealing with connection 
augmentation costs where many potential future customers benefit from the augmentation of 
customer’s connection. However, we found in practise that pioneer schemes are seldom 
used and that the administration required for potentially multiple pioneer schemes was seen 
as burdensome by some NSPs. 
Recommendation 9: To address costs associated with LG, we recommend: 
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• As an interim solution acknowledge the status quo situation as a means of managing 
the problems in the short term and additionally encouraging technologies that 
manage their behaviour on the grid (Option 1). 
• As bi-directional augmentations become necessary and more prevalent, collect data 
on their marginal cost, frequency and locational distribution to include them in the 
methodology in an appropriate way (Option 2). If these are routinely included in the 
LRMC calculations, it is potentially reasonable that they should be subtracted from 
the LRMC value calculation in future as it applies to a LNC.6  
Ultimately it is a matter for the AER to determine when bi-directional flow costs represent 
justifiable expenditure, and to act as an arbiter for this expenditure to be costed and allocated 
fairly. Further industry discussion on this matter is required. 
 
 	  2=FOWULR4UITRP8:0SD>PH4VU
This section is largely informed by the economic modelling performed as part of this project: 
please refer to Kelly et al. (2016) for further detail. 
 	  2=LUVL4--H4HTDVRTU
In implementing a reform it is important to consider effects on the marketplace in the present 
context of the Australian energy market. The National Electricity Forecasting Report (NEFR) 
reports that for 2016 the generation from rooftop PV alone was 5,648 GWh (Australian 
Energy Market Operator (AEMO) 2016).  There is a large number of generators already 
contributing to lower network peaks and thus reducing or deferring network augmentation 
requirements. Implementation of an LNC must consider these generators. 
We understand that the impact of existing generation profiles on network augmentation of is 
already factored into network planning. We also note that a large number of existing local 
generators are non-dispatchable and are unable to respond to a price incentive. 
We recommend that to receive a LNC, a generator must be able to respond to a price signal, 
either by making: 
• a decision to undertake new capital investment, or; 
• an operational change. 
In the case of existing generators, the decision to invest in the system is already undertaken, 
and as such an operational change is the only impact that an LNC can have. To work 
through the implications of an LNC for some examples of existing generator types: 
• Cogeneration facilities operating on a daytime peak-lopping profile would likely be 
influenced by the LNC price signal and change their operating profile to extend 
generation hours into the evening peak period or operate at higher load during the 
day.  
                                                
6 This is similar to the approach applied for solar in Minnesota, in that costs were acknowledged to play an 
important role in the fair value setting but could not be calculated now and a calculation methodology 
determination was deferred until a future update. 
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• Existing rooftop solar PV generators will have no ability to influence their generation 
profile to respond to the price signal, that is, unless storage or load shifting 
technology is procured to adjust the PV export profile. 
• Larger generators such as bagasse bioenergy currently generating may or may not 
change their operation in response to an LNC, depending on the balance of 
incentives.  In many cases they may already be operating at network peak times 
driven by energy market price signals. This is more likely where network and energy 
market peak periods align. 
 	  :HY-H4HTDVRTUW4GHTNB
Reference to generators under 10kW is primarily focused on non-dispatchable residential 
rooftop solar PV and should be interpreted as such.  
We consider rooftop PV systems relatively unlikely to be incentivised by an LNC, as the 
additional value of an LNC is less significant than changes in the installed system cost, and 
the residential market is arguably less influenced by strictly economic factors. In addition, 
rooftop PV systems are less likely to result in network benefits than commercial systems, as 
they are non-dispatchable, and more likely to be located in areas with evening peaks. 
Where batteries are in place this may change this conclusion to some degree, however 
further work needs to be done on the influence of an LNC on system sizing/design and 
dispatch strategy for batteries to better understand the value of offering LNCs to small 
generators with storage.  
Recommendation 10: We recommend that LNC payments should be made to existing 
generators where this can incentivise behaviour that will reduce network costs. LNCs should 
not be paid to existing non-dispatchable generators, or to new generators under 
10kW. More work is required to determine the value of offering LNCs to existing dispatchable 
generators, depending on the network and generator circumstances. 
This recommendation aims to maximise economic benefits to all consumers. 
Note that the implementation of an LNC according to generator type or circumstances would 
break the technological neutrality principle outlined in Section 2.5. This may be warranted to 
achieve an optimal societal outcome. 
 
 	  4H4HTDVRTUYLVKRWVDTHVDLOHT
We recommend that generation plant that does not have a retailer relationship would need to 
secure such a relationship to enable the LNC. Without this, a new payment relationship 
would be required directly between a DNSP and a generator. As DNSPs are not in the 
business of managing large numbers of payment relationships we found that it was retailers 
who were best positioned to carry out this function. 
Recommendation 11 
The LNC should be mediated via a retailer, so generators without a retailer should secure 
that relationship. The LNC should be structured in such a way as to promote easy retailer 
pass through, and retailers should be encouraged to implement this pass through. 
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992:12192?5184C
The required inputs to the calculation of an LNC are summarised in Table 8, followed by the 
recommended methodology. The recommendations from the previous sections are 
summarised in Section 8.1. 
Table 8: Required inputs to the calculation of an LNC 
INPUT Already Calculated1  Comment 
LRMC by network level  
and customer class Yes $/kVA/yr 
Transmission 
Locational charges Yes 
$/kVA/year or $/kVA/Month. Available in Transmission 
pricing schedules 
Average power factor 
for each network level 
and customer class 
Yes (No unit) 
Average Distribution 
Loss Factors (DLF) for 
each network level 
Yes (No unit) 
Peak, Shoulder and off-
peak times for each 
customer class 
Yes 
Times of day and year. It is recommended that peak 
times are set more narrowly than for consumption 
tariffs, with a maximum of approx. 500 hours per year in 
the peak period. 
Peaking probabilities No Probability that a peak event will occur within each of the identified (peak/shoulder/off-peak) periods 
Benefit sharing ratio No 
Ratio of total LRMC benefit that would be used as a 
basis for the LNC incentive. Remaining LRMC to be a 









This should be included in the future to enable value 
calculation of LNC, but data to enable calculation is 
currently unavailable  
Costs of augmentation 
enabling a bi-directional 
network 
No 
The methodology allows for subtraction of the costs for 
network upgrades allowing bi-directional electricity 
flows. As these become more prevalent, their marginal 
cost, frequency and location distribution needs to be re-
examined to include them in the methodology in an 
appropriate way. 
LRMC of Transmission 
network2 Yes 
This should be included in the future to accurately 
reflect transmission network costs through a forward-
looking methodology. 
Notes: 1) Required for network business operation in existing business activities 
Notes: 2) Not currently disclosed by TNSPs nor used as the direct basic for transmission pricing. 
 
The recommended methodology for calculating an LNC is as follows: 
Step 1 
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Calculate LRMC broken down by network level and customer class as per the network’s 
existing LRMC calculation methodology used for tariff setting. 
 
Step 2 
Add the LRMC of the transmission network: 
As a placeholder for LRMC, ISF used the below calculation as a compromise between the 
positions of generation proponents and DNSPs in establishing avoidable value.  
Use locational and non-locational components of the transmission charges levied on the 
DNSP !"#$!"#$%&'%%'($ = !"#$%&"'$!!!ℎ!"#$! ∗ 12 + !"! − !"!!!"#$%&"'$!!!ℎ!"#$% ∗ 8760!"#$%&#!!"#$%!!"#$%&  
Where: 
• LRMC is in units of $/kVA/year 
• Locational charges are in units of $/kVA/month 




Reduce the LRMC for all levels by the benefit-sharing ratio. 
 
Step 4 
Locate the generator in the network by both network level of connection and by customer 
type. Then, the ratio of the loss factors is calculated for each network level above the 
generator connection point.  !"#$!"# != !"#$!!"#$!!!"#$%&'(!!"#"!$!× !!"#!"#"$%&'$!!"##$!%&"#!!"#$%!"#!"#$%&'!!"#"!  
 
Step 5 
Convert LRMC $/kVA/yr values to volumetric $/kWh values for each period by multiplying by 
the probability of peak occurring in that period, and dividing by the hours the period occurs. $!"ℎ ! !"#$ = !"#$%&'"!!"#$!×!!!"#$ ! 1!ℎ!"#$!!"!!"#$!!"#$%&!×!!"#$%&#!!"#$%!!"#$%&! 
 $!"ℎ ! !""!!"#$! = !"#$%&'"!!"#$!×!!!""!!"#$ ! 1!ℎ!"#$!!"!!""!!"#$!!"#$%&!×!!"#$%&#!!"#$%!!"#$%&! 
 
Noting that  !!""!!"#$ + !!"#$! != 1 
 
This equation can be adapted to allow for further time periods (e.g., shoulder) through using 
the same formula and ensuring that the sum of the probability terms !!"#$, !!""!!"#$, !!!!"#$%& etc. is equal to 1. 
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Recommendation 1: Use LRMC as the basis of the value calculation for an LNC. 
Recommendation 2: Use the same method to calculate the LRMC for LNC setting as 
for the tariff setting. When the marginal avoided costs of reduced investment in downsizing 
or retirement as a result of local generation are better understood by NSPs it should be 
included in the potential savings signalled via the LNC.  
Recommendation 3:. Apply a discounting and benefit-sharing reduction to the LRMC 
to allow for uncertainty present in LRMC demand forecasts and cost estimates.   
Recommendation 4: Assess LRMC based on customer class and network level to 
delineate parts of the network that particular generators may impact. While there was a 
range of opinions on how location specific the credit should be, it was determined that the 
LNC should move towards locational specificity at the same rate that cost reflective 
consumption tariffs move towards specificity, so that the LNC uses the same LRMC 
calculations as used for tariff setting. 
Recommendation 5: Adjust the LRMC for each network based on generator connection 
point to account for the capacity effects as a result of losses, noting that this adjustment 
will need to be calculated for generator connection level within each customer class. 
Recommendation 6: Allocate tariff value through a well-targeted volumetric TOU 
structure. To provide the right availability incentive the DNSP should choose relatively few 
hours of the year for the peak period and ensure the peak period selected has a high peak 
probability.  
Recommendation 7: Determine avoidable transmission LRMC value. In converting this 
to a price signal we propose that this is converted to a targeted volumetric payment, as per 
the rest of the LNC.  
Recommendation 8: Exclude avoided losses from the LNC calculation as this is 
covered in retailer credit offered for energy exports. Retailers should undertake to offer the 
avoided loss value to LG for all exports. 
Recommendation 9: To manage LG costs on the network: 
• As an interim solution, acknowledge the status quo situation as a means of 
managing the problems in the short term and encouraging technologies that manage 
their behaviour on the grid. 
• As bi-directional augmentations become necessary and more prevalent, collect data 
on their marginal cost, frequency and locational distribution to include them in the 
methodology in an appropriate way. If these are routinely included in the LRMC 
calculations, it is potentially reasonable that they should be subtracted from the 
LRMC value calculation in future as it applies to a LNC. 
Recommendation 10: We recommend that LNC payments should be made to existing 
generators where this can incentivise behaviour that will reduce network costs. On these 
grounds LNCs should not be paid to existing non-dispatchable generators, or to new 
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generators under 10kW. More work is required to determine the value of offering LNCs to 
existing dispatchable generators, depending on the network and generator circumstances. 
Recommendation 11: The LNC should be mediated via a retailer, so generators 
without a retailer should secure that relationship. The LNC should be structured in such a 
way as to promote easy retailer pass through, and retailers should be encouraged to 
implement this pass through. 
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Figure 13: Summary of recommendations 
 
Value calculation 
Framework for network value of 
LG 
• 1) Use LRMC as the value basis 
for the LNC.  
• 2) Use the same method to 
calculate LRMC as is used by 
networks in tariff setting.  
• 2.1) Include repex value from 
downsizing or retirement as this 
becomes better understood.  
• 3) Apply a discounting and benefit 
sharing factor to the LRMC. 
Calculation by location, network 
level and customer class 
• 4) Locational specificity to match 
specificity used by networks in 
consumption tariffs. Use customer 
class and voltage level as 
locational proxies for the type of 
network. 
• 5) Adjust LRMC for the network 
value of losses and network power 
factor impacts. 
Transmission value 
• 7) Include Transmission LRMC 
value, signal value through 
probabilistic tariff structure as per 
recommendation 6). 
Avoided losses 
• 8) Do not include the value of 
avoided losses, these are included 
in the energy value. 
LG Costs 
• 9) Apply the interim solution of an 
export gateway. 
• As bi-directional augmentation 
costs become more commonly 
quantified, subtract these from the 
LRMC value.  
Tariff Creation 
Volumetric allocation:  
• 6) Assess the probability of the 
peak happening in each hour of 
the year, allocate hours into peak, 
shoulder, off-peak (and optionally 
critical peak) periods. 
• Choose relatively tight peak 
periods with high peaking 
probability. 
• Multiply the value set in the 
previous steps by the peaking 
probability of each hour in the 
relevant period. 
Generator inclusions and 
exclusions 
• 10) Exclude existing non-
dispatchable generators, and new 
generators under 10kW from LNC 
payments (to maximise economic 
benefits). 
Payment settlement 
•  11) The LNC should be mediated 
via a retailer; generators without a 
retailer should secure that 
relationship.  
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  0:08#!6:
This work provides a recommendation for an LNC methodology that is strongly aligned with 
cost-reflective consumption tariff setting methodologies. The inputs required for the LNC 
methodology are the same, or very similar, to those required for setting consumption tariffs, 
so the introduction of an LNC should not require undue administrative resources for 
calculation.  
Some of the questions that have arisen during LNC methodology development are of broad 
interest, and should be debated outside the rather technical discussion of setting an LNC 
methodology. In particular, the question of how to meet the cost of adapting our networks for 
a future where the prosumer is the norm, and how those costs should be shared, is a broad 
societal question that deserves general discussion.  
 
   .GGLV LR4DOTHUHDTFK4HHGHG
This work highlights the following areas where additional research and debate is desirable in 
order to refine the recommended method: 
• Calculating the value of local generation and storage in reducing replacement 
investment; 
• Calculating the network costs associated with increasing DG penetration; 
• Discussion of how the above costs of DG should be borne in the context of an 
evolving electricity network; and 
• Refinement of the value setting and benefit-sharing parameters to ensure that the 
LNC is sufficiently targeted to incentivise generator investment and operational 
behaviour. 
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   	
Table 9: Methodology Comparisons from investigated international precedents 
Methodology Value calculation Location  Time 















































UK CDCM  Marginal Cost based on 500MW increments By voltage level 
Probabilistic: based 
on peak periods and 












Connecticut Declining percentage of DUOS and TUOS 
Generator and 
consumer in same 
distribution territory 
Applies to exports 
not consumed by 
customers other sites 
within billing period 
Volumetric        
Minnesota 
NPV of value of 
generator over lifetime. 
12 months hourly load & 
generation data  
Assumed low voltage 
(LV) (Solar only) All 
Volumetric, [avoided 
generation, capacity, 
ancillary services and 
environmental benefits] 




ActewAGL Estimate avoided TUOS Assume LV (Solar only) All Volumetric        
Ausnet Unknown Assume LV (Solar only) Summer generation only Volumetric 

 




Lowest avoided cost 
Very location specific, 
requires user to be 
identified  
        
 
1 Both Western Australia in the WA Wheeling Method and Transmission pricing guidelines include a methodology based on this approach
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